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DETROIT’S BANKRUPTCY AND MARKET REENTRY
James L. Tatum III*
ABSTRACT
In 2018, four years after the Motor City went bankrupt, Detroit reentered
the municipal securities market and issued new debt. The bond offer is both
indicative of the city’s financial turnaround and is counter to the theory that
bankrupted municipalities will be punished by markets with prohibitively
expensive interest rates post-bankruptcy. This Article examines chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, and the ramifications for bankrupted municipalities as they
reenter the municipal securities market.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 4, 2018, Detroit increased its initial offer of $111 million in
general obligation bonds to $135 million.1 The initial offer was oversubscribed.2
In other words, there was more demand for the bankrupted city’s debt than there
was debt to offer.3 The City was able to increase the amount of debt offered and
decrease the interest rate from the initial offer.4 Predominant views on chapter 9
of the Code posited that the City should have been shunned from the
marketplace.5 Not only should the City have paid a market penalty—an
exorbitant rate of interest—when it reentered the market, it should not have been
able to reenter so quickly.6 The City issued new debt at terms comparable to
other insolvent (yet not bankrupted) municipalities,7 which is an invitation for
further analysis. This Article takes up that invitation to examine Detroit’s case
and to provide investors, citizens and elected officials information on municipal
bankruptcy.
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to elaborate on the obstacles
to analyzing municipal bankruptcy. One, municipal default—failure by the
debtor to pay principal or interest—is rare.8 Two, of the small number of
municipalities that default on their debts, an even smaller number petition a
bankruptcy court for debt adjustment under chapter 9 of the Code.9 Moreover,
petitions do not always result in a case. Boise County, Idaho had its petition

1
Karen Pierog, Post-Bankruptcy Detroit Returns to Hungry Muni Bond Market, REUTERS (Dec. 4,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-detroit-bonds/post-bankruptcy-detroit-returns-to-yield-hungry-munibond-market-idUSKBN1O400Z.
2
See Gunjan Banerji, Detroit Sees Big Demand in Muni Market Return, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:40
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-forgiving-is-the-muni-market-detroit-will-find-out-1543886307.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See generally LEON R. BARSON, ET AL., CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON
NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS
AND CASES 11 (INSIDE THE MINDS) (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (“Municipalities that seek bankruptcy relief
should expect a negative effect on their credit ratings, at least for a period.”).
6
See id.
7
See BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHI., UNLIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, SERIES 2018C,
2018D (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1222772-ES954787-ES1355739.pdf.
8
See John E. Petersen, Municipal Defaults: Eighty Years Make a Big Difference, 34 MUN. FIN. J. 27, 45
(2013).
9
David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063,
1080–84 (2013).
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rejected by the Bankruptcy Court in 2011.10 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was
ordered to rescind its petition by Governor Tom Corbett that same year.11
Even the word “municipality” must be analyzed to fully illustrate the
difficulty inherent in any analysis of municipal bankruptcy. “Municipality”
describes all manner of creatures—counties, cities, towns, and special districts
like school districts, water and sewer districts, public utilities and development
authorities.12 Special districts represent the majority of municipal
bankruptcies.13 However, those municipal units are not the focus of this analysis
and have not been the focus of market analysts or bankruptcy experts in their
commentaries on the impact of chapter 9 on creditworthiness.14
Detroit’s case was chosen for analysis for three reasons. One, the City filed
for bankruptcy.15 Two, pre-bankruptcy, the City was financially and
economically distressed.16 Three, the City issued new debt within a few years
post-bankruptcy.17
Once more, there is insufficient data to use statistical analyses to evaluate
theories related to municipal bankruptcy because municipal default and
bankruptcy are rare occurrences. In lieu of statistical analyses, limited theories
and information can be derived from the limited number of cases in existence.
Despite these limitations, cases such as Detroit’s bankruptcy offer an
opportunity to better understand chapter 9 of the Code.
This Article will proceed in seven parts. Part One is an overview of the
municipal securities market. Part Two chronicles Detroit’s financial distress and
10
See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & G. ALLEN BASS, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE
LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 429 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing In re Boise County, 465 B.R. 156 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2011)).
11
See Sabrina Tavernise, Governor Moves to Take Fiscal Control of Pennsylvania’s Capital, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/governor-corbett-of-pennsylvania-moves-to-takecontrol-of-harrisburg.html.
12
Fred L. Morrison, The Insolvency of Public Entities in the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. Supp. 567,
567–68 (2002).
13
AMDURSKY, GILLETTE & BASS, supra note 10, at 417 (“For the most part, recent defaults have occurred
as a function of idiosyncratic events or financial failures in special districts rather than as a result of systemic
problems that affect a broad category of general purpose municipalities.”).
14
See John F. Wasik, In Uncertain Times, Municipal Bonds Call for Caution, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/business/buying-municipal-bonds-calls-for-caution.html.
15
Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html.
16
See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT (1996) (describing the narrative of Detroit’s decline as a city).
17
Quinn Klinefelter, Detroit’s Big Comeback: Out of Bankruptcy, a Rebirth, NPR (Dec. 28, 2018, 7:24
AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/28/680629749/out-of-bankruptcy-detroit-reaches-financial-milestone.
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economic decline. Part Three intersperses details from Detroit’s case with a
history of municipal bankruptcy and a review of its form and function. Part Four
briefly discusses the City’s financial turnaround and the theory that bankruptcy
provides a “fresh start.” Part Five details the City’s offer of new debt. Part Six
provides an overview of the market conditions—or economic environment in
which the City made its offer. Part Seven evaluates the theory that bankrupted
municipalities will face stiff market penalties upon reentry.
I.

MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET

States and municipalities levy taxes on the incomes, property and purchases
of the citizens within their boundaries.18 The resources from those levies are
expended for services like police and fire safety, parks and recreation, and trash
removal.19 However, demands for safe and reliable infrastructure—roads, water
and sewer systems, and other capital projects—often exceed annual tax
collections.20 In an alternative to tax collection, states and municipalities issue
bonds.21 A bond is a debt instrument that represents a liability on the part of the
bond’s issuer or debtor and an asset on the part of the bond’s purchaser or
creditor.22 Bonds can be structured in many ways.23 The bond’s indenture or
contract will specify the amount borrowed (principal), cost to borrow (interest
rate), method of repayment (security interest) and when the borrowed money
must be repaid (maturity date).24
For municipal bonds, the debt instruments are typically structured either as
general obligation bonds (“general obligations”) or revenue bonds (“special
obligations”).25 The main difference between the two is the method of
repayment.26 General obligations are supported by the borrower’s “full faith and
credit.”27 In layman’s terms, full faith and credit means the borrower’s power to

18
See generally BYRON LUTZ, RAVEN MOLLOY & HUI SHAN, THE HOUSING CRISIS AND STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE: FIVE CHANNELS 1, 1–2 (2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/
2010/201049/201049pap.pdf (describing the ways municipalities can supplement tax revenues).
19
See Morrison, supra note 12, at 567–70.
20
See Morrison, supra note 12, at 569.
21
See DAVID SCOTT, INVESTING IN BONDS 52 (2004).
22
Id. at 1.
23
See generally Robert Doty, Diversity and Default Risks of Municipal Bonds, 34 MUN. FIN. J. 55, 59 n.
11 (2013) (describing what can be included under the term “general obligation bond”).
24
SCOTT, supra note 21, at 5–7.
25
Morrison, supra note 12, at 569–71.
26
See Morrison, supra note 12, at 569–71.
27
See David M. Eisenberg, Note, Creditors’ Remedies in Municipal Default, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1373
(1976).
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levy taxes.28 Because tax payments are compulsory and the power to tax is in
some ways inexhaustible, general obligations are viewed as safe assets (at low
risk for default).29 Revenue bonds are riskier, however: municipal units that
operate in a business-like manner—a municipal airport, water and sewer district,
or port authority—use revenue bonds to raise money for capital projects. The
revenues from proprietary activities are the method of repayment, hence the
name “revenue bonds”.30 Unlike the near inexhaustible power to tax, public
projects sometimes fail.31 If revenues from the public project are insufficient to
service debt, creditors have no recourse and cannot compel the debtor to pay
them with other resources.32 In any case, even the riskier special obligations are
safe assets relative to corporate bonds issued by private companies.33
In total, the market for those debt instruments—municipal securities
market—was measured at $3.8 trillion in 2018.34 That market also includes
financial derivatives.35 These are the complex instruments—options, swaps and
futures—that came to the public’s attention in the midst of the Wall Street crash
of 2007.36 Such instruments also had a role in both Detroit’s bankruptcy in 2013,
and the bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Alabama in 2011.37 However, those
securities have a much smaller role in the municipal securities market compared
to traditional bonds.38
Investors in the municipal securities market often desire to purchase safe and
secure assets with a tax preference. The tax preference comes in the form of
accrued interest paid out to owners of municipal bonds and is mostly exempt
from federal income tax.39 Vanguard, the mutual fund and financial advisory
firm, for example, offers thirteen investment funds that exclusively invest in

28

Morrison, supra note 12, at 569–71.
See Morrison, supra note 12, at 569–70.
30
See Morrison, supra note 12, at 570.
31
See Morrison, supra note 12, at 571.
32
David A. Skeel, Jr., What Is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675,
684–85 (2015).
33
See Doty, supra note 23, at 70.
34
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors, Municipal Securities,
Liability, FED. RSRV. ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DNSMSL (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
35
SEC, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 91–92 (July 31, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/
files/munireport073112.pdf.
36
See DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, THE GLOBAL DERIVATES MARKET 10–11 (2008), https://www.math.
nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/global_derivatives_market.pdf.
37
In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 237 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
38
See SEC, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 92 (July 31, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/
files/munireport073112.pdf.
39
See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 57–58.
29
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municipal bonds to its customers.40 Fidelity,41 Charles Schwab,42 and other
mutual fund and financial advisory firms have similar investment options
promoted on the basis of their low risk and tax benefits. Because of the low
default risk and tax benefits, the municipal securities market attracts institutional
and individual investors alike.43 Low default risk does not mean a zero-default
risk, however.
II. DETROIT’S DECLINE AND BANKRUPTCY FILING
Thomas Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis is an unparalleled treatise on
the entropy that has occurred in so many American cities.44 The book details
how Detroit, the “Arsenal of Democracy,” known to produce tanks for World
War II as easily as it produced Cadillacs, shrank from a population of 1.8 million
in 1950 to approximately 1 million in the 1990s at the time the book was
published.45 In short, the City was subjected to the same forces that left Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh equally desolate.46 Suburbanization—a trend
incentivized by racially exclusive federal home loans and local land use
restrictions—pushed white urban residents to suburban areas with lush lawns
and white picket fences.47 Deindustrialization followed.48 Vertical development,
a feature of cities, was suboptimal for snake-like assembly lines that could
spread out on wider and cheaper land in the suburbs.49 Equally important,
competition from abroad incentivized companies to not only move factories out

40
Vanguard Mutual Funds, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/list?assetclass=
bond&taxeff=xmpt#/mutual-funds/asset-class/month-end-returns (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
41
Fidelity Mutual Funds, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/fidelity-funds/overview (last
visited Oct. 3, 2020).
42
Tax-Free Bond Funds, SCHWAB, https://www.schwab.com/mutual-funds/schwab-mutual-funds/fixedincome/tax-exempt (last visited Aug. 13, 2020) (explaining Schwab’s tax-free bond funds investment option).
43
See generally SEC, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 92 (July 31, 2012), https://www.
sec.gov/files/munireport073112.pdf. (discussing and recommending improvements to the municipal securities
market).
44
SUGRUE, supra note 16, at 1–17 (examining the role race, housing, and job discrimination played in the
decline of Detroit).
45
SUGRUE, supra note 16, at xlii, 18; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS POPULATION, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, MICHIGAN (July 14, 1993), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/
decennial/1990/cp-2/cp-2-24-1.pdf.
46
Daniel Hartley, Urban Decline in Rust-Belt Cities, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND (May 20, 2013),
https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2013-economiccommentaries/ec-201306-urban-decline-in-rust-belt-cities.aspx (examining patterns that characterize the
process of urban decline in cities such as Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh).
47
See SUGRUE, supra note 16, at xv–xvi (discussing the “long process of white flight” that plagued
Detroit).
48
See SUGRUE, supra note 16, at 125–52.
49
See SUGRUE, supra note 16, at 125–52.
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of Detroit, but out of the United States to countries where far-off laborers could
be paid cents on the American laborer’s dollar.50
An exodus of people and jobs corresponded to a loss in property tax
revenue.51 In response, Detroit’s local elected officials attempted to capture the
remaining income and wealth with new taxes.52 Mayor Jerome Cavanagh
instituted a personal and corporate income tax in 1962.53 Utility user’s taxes
were instituted by Mayor Roman Gribbs in 1971.54 Casino revenue taxes were
instituted under Mayor Dennis Archer in 1999.55 However, all of these taxes
could not recapture the riches that the City once enjoyed.56
By 2009, auto sector employment in the Detroit metropolitan area had fallen
to approximately 80,000 from 180,000 in 2000.57 The “Big Three” car
companies—General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford Motor Company—employed
fewer people and had a lower market share at the time the City went bankrupt.58
General Motors and Chrysler, in perhaps a precursor to the City’s own doom,
filed for bankruptcy in 2009.59
In his 1995 article in The Atlantic, Witold Rybczynski, captured the problem
for American cities like Detroit when he wrote:
[A]lthough a city is often said to be shrinking, its physical area remains
the same. The same number of streets must be policed and repaired,
sewers and water lines maintained, and transit systems operated. With
fewer taxpayers, revenues are lower, often leading to higher taxes per

50

See SUGRUE, supra note 16, at 138–40.
Nathan Bomey & John Gallagher, How Detroit Went Broke: The Answers May Surprise You—and
Don’t Blame Coleman Young, DET. FREE PRESS (Sept. 15, 2013), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
michigan/detroit/2013/09/15/how-detroit-went-broke-the-answers-may-surprise-you-and/77152028/
(discussing how the “amid huge exodus of residents, plummeting tax revenues and skyrocketing home
abandonment, Detroit’s leaders engaged in a billion-dollar borrowing binge, created new taxes and failed to cut
expenses when they needed to.”).
52
Id. (“City leaders tried repeatedly to reverse sliding revenue through new taxes.”).
53
Id. (“[T]he city turned for the first time in 1962 to an income tax: 1% for residents, nonresidents and
corporations.”).
54
Id. (“[T]he city also instituted a new utility tax in 1971 and a wagering tax when casinos began
operation here in 1999.”).
55
Id.
56
Id. (explaining that “using taxes to raise revenue was that it made the City a more expensive—and less
attractive—place to live and do business”).
57
Yu Peng Lin, The Fall of Detroit: A Financial Economist’s Point of View, 6 INT’L J. ECON. AND FIN.
43, 48 (2014) (analyzing trends in Detroit’s auto sector employment from 1990 to 2013).
58
Id. at 46–47 (analyzing the market share of the Big Three versus their international competitors).
59
See David A. Skeel, Jr., From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER L.J. 121, 121
(2015) (examining the aftereffects of Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies on Detroit).
51
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capita, an overall deterioration of services, or both. More people
depart, and the downward spiral continues.60

The depths of the City’s poverty even led it to subvert the social contract:
the City’s cuts to police and fire protection—the public safety response time was
said to be an hour in 2013—left murder (316 in 2013)61 and arson (611 in 2013)62
undeterred.
The City’s pre-bankruptcy financial condition was explicitly detailed in a
report by the State Treasurer to Governor Rick Snyder in early 2013.63 The
report concluded that “a local government financial emergency exists within the
City of Detroit because no satisfactory plan exists to resolve a serious financial
problem.”64 Of the City’s problems, the State Treasurer noted that the City
suffered from a “Cash Crisis,” “General Fund Deficits,” “Long-Term
Liabilities,” and a “Bureaucratic Structure” that “makes it extremely difficult for
City officials to restructure the City’s operations in any meaningful and timely
manner.”65 Michigan Treasurer Andy Dillon’s involvement was the first step in
the state’s response to financial trouble in its constituent municipalities—a
response that some have called anti-democratic.66 Under Michigan state law at
the time, financially troubled municipalities were appointed a state receiver
known as an “emergency financial manager”67 and later simply as an
“emergency manager,”68 who would temporarily assume the powers of the
mayor and city council.
More popularly, in a Detroit Free Press feature titled How Detroit Went
Broke, the authors elaborately detailed the City’s history—its decline from its

60
Witold Rybczynski, Downsizing Cities, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1995), https://www.theatlantic.com/past/
docs/issues/95oct/rybczyns.htm.
61
FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT (2013), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.2013/tables/table-8/table-8-state-cuts/table_8_offenses_known_to_law_enforcement_michigan_by_city_2013.
xls (displaying crime statistics of offenses known to law enforcement in Michigan by city).
62
Id. (displaying crime statistics of offenses known to law enforcement in Michigan by city).
63
See MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DETROIT FINANCIAL REVIEW TEAM (Feb. 19, 2013),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Review-Team-Report-2-19-13_415662_7.pdf (discussing Detroit’s
pre-bankruptcy financial condition).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Jason Stanley, Detroit’s Drought of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (July 29, 2014),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/detroits-drought-of-democracy/.
67
See generally CITIZENS RSCH. COUNCIL OF MICH., AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT (PUBLIC ACT 72 OF 1990, FORMERLY PUBLIC ACT 101 OF 1988) 1
(1990), https://crcmich.org/wp-content/uploads/pa72analysis.pdf (examining the extent of the authority and the
length of time required for the appointment of an emergency financial manager).
68
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1542(e) (West 2020) (defining emergency manager).
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industrial heyday and a disastrous financial deal orchestrated by former Mayor
Kwame Kilpatrick (currently in prison for corruption).69 For years, even before
Mayor Kilpatrick’s tenure, the City borrowed money for operational
expenditures.70 Unable to borrow any more on its own credit, the City created
two shell entities or “service corporations” that issued securities known as
certificates of participation—debt by another name.71 The proceeds from that
debt issuance were used to make payments to the City’s underfunded pension
systems, the General Retirement System, and Police and Fire Retirement
System.72 That debt structure was further complicated by multiple layers of bond
insurance and interest rate swaps.73 The deal blew up.74 Many factors led to the
City’s bankruptcy, like the 48% decline in state shared revenue between 1998
and 2012, but the deal orchestrated by the now-incarcerated mayor added a hefty
burden to the City’s balance sheet.75
On March 14, 2013, over the protest of the City’s local elected officials, an
emergency manager was appointed.76 Kevyn Orr, a bankruptcy attorney from
Jones Day, was appointed to oversee the City’s financial recovery—or
bankruptcy.77 Shortly after his appointment, Orr halted payments on the City’s
debts.78 On June 14, 2013, Detroit missed a $39.7 million payment owed to the
shell entities created under Mayor Kilpatrick.79 That same day, Orr released the
City’s “Proposal for Creditors.”80 The plan, had it been implemented, would
have adjusted the City’s bonded debts and other liabilities outside of bankruptcy
court.81 Creditors rejected the plan.82 In the absence of an ability to force losses

69

Bomey & Gallagher, supra note 51.
See Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement with Respect to Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment
of Debts of the City of Detroit, at 118–20, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 5, 2014)
[hereinafter Detroit’s Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement].
71
Id. at 140.
72
Id. at 103–05.
73
Id. at 104.
74
Id. at 136–39.
75
Bomey & Gallagher, supra note 51 (“Lansing politicians reduced Detroit’s state-shared revenue by
48% from 1998 to 2012, withholding $172 million from the city, according to state records.”).
76
Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer Is Named to Manage an Ailing Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14,
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/us/gov-rick-snyder-kevyn-orr-emergency-manager-detroit.html
(“Michigan officials on Thursday appointed the lawyer, Kevyn Orr, a partner in the Jones Day law firm, as an
emergency manager to oversee operations in Detroit, one of the largest cities to ever receive such intervention.”).
77
Id.
78
See Detroit’s Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 70, at 129.
79
Detroit’s Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 70, at 132.
80
CITY OF DETROIT, PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS 1 (2013), https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/
files/2018-05/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf.
81
Detroit’s Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 70, at 131.
82
See Detroit’s Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 70, at 132.
70
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onto creditors and bind those creditors to a settlement, the City petitioned a
forum where it could achieve such ends: bankruptcy court.83
Of the approximately $18 billion in total liabilities at the time of the City’s
bankruptcy, $3.5 billion was owed to the City’s retirees in the form of pension
promises and $5.7 billion in other post-employment benefits; $6.4 billion owed
to bondholders secured by revenues from the City’s water and sewer system;
$651 million owed to bondholders supposedly protected by the City’s full faith
and credit and $2.1 billion owed to other creditors.84 It took approximately a
year and three months to unwind the City’s bonded debts and other liabilities.85
From July 18, 2013 to November 7, 2014, the City battled with creditors in
bankruptcy court—most notably over whether Matisses and Cézannes from the
Detroit Institute of Arts (“DIA”) would be sold to make creditors whole.86
III. CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
In the eyes of some, “Detroit” already went bankrupt when General Motors
filed for bankruptcy on June 1, 2009.87 In its bankruptcy, the automaker adjusted
its debts and sold off its unprofitable divisions: Hummer, Pontiac, Saab, and
Saturn.88 Detroit, the city, on the other hand, did not sell off its fire stations,
parks or City Hall. In this respect, municipal bankruptcy substantially differs
from commercial and personal bankruptcy.89 Governments do not conduct fire
sales, nor can local polities cease to deliver on their part of the social contract.90

83

See Davey & Walsh, supra note 15.
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 207–08 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
85
See id.
86
See Randy Kennedy & Monica Davey, Detroit’s Creditors Eye Its Art Collection, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/arts/design/detroits-creditors-eye-its-art-collection.html. See
generally Michigan Radio Newsroom, DIA Displays More Than 100 Works by Picasso and Matisse in New
Exhibit, MICH. RADIO (July, 12, 2012), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/dia-displays-more-100-workspicasso-and-matisse-new-exhibit (as of 2012, the DIA continues to have a large selection of works by Matisse,
Cézanne, and Picasso); Steven Gray, Detroit: 10 Things to Do, TIME (June 4, 2010), http://content.time.com/
time/travel/cityguide/printout/0,31522,1994456_1994357_1994239,00.html (mentioning the Cézanne collection and
ranking the DIA as Detroit’s top attraction).
87
See generally Mitt Romney, Let Detroit Go Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2008), https://www.
nytimes.com/2008/11/19/opinion/19romney.html (advocating for General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler to file for
bankruptcy to restructure the industry).
88
Micheline Maynard, A Painful Departure for G.M. Brands, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2009), https://www.
nytimes.com/2009/02/18/business/18brands.html.
89
See generally Lotta Moberg & Richard E. Wagner, Default Without Capital Account: The Economics
of Municipal Bankruptcy, 14 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 30, 34 (2014) (comparing corporate bankruptcy to municipal
bankruptcy).
90
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1384 (2012).
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This Section uses Detroit’s bankruptcy to expound on the form and function
of municipal bankruptcy, what occurs when a case is filed, and how the
disposition of assets and liabilities is handled. Additionally, this Section briefly
comments on the Great Depression and resulting drop in municipal revenues,
thus necessitating federal intervention into local affairs in the first place. Lastly,
this Section compares and contrasts the power of the bankruptcy court and the
recourse of creditors in a municipal bankruptcy versus commercial bankruptcy.
A. Great Depression and Municipal Finance
Congress first provided municipalities access to bankruptcy court in 1934
after hundreds of defaults—a previously rare phenomena:
Estimated municipal bond defaults rapidly jumped from 678 in
November, 1932, to 1,729 by January 1, 1934. As of March 1, 1934,
thirty-seven municipalities or 11.93 per cent of those in the class with
a population of more than 30,000 were in default. Defaults by
municipalities had become a national problem.91

The Great Depression made it as difficult for cities and towns to pay their
debts as it did for households and businesses.92 Moreover, if municipal default
appeared imminent, creditors had an incentive to race to the courthouse.93 In
each case, creditors hoped to have their individual claims validated by a court
with jurisdiction to secure payment on their bonds, irrespective of how writs of
mandamus—court ordered tax increases—could be injurious to the debtor’s
local economy.94 Even if debtors avoided adversarial lawsuits and reached a
consensual settlement with the majority of creditors to adjust or refund debts,
those settlements could not be consummated.95 If, for example, a debtor reached
a settlement with 51% of creditors, the other 49% were not bound by the
settlement terms and could demand payment under the terms that the bonds were
first issued.96
State law was, and still is, impotent. The Contracts Clause says that “[n]o
State shall . . . pass any . . . [l]aw impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”97 In
previous economic crises, states attempted to provide relief to their constituent
91

Henry W. Lehmann, The Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act, 5 J. FIN. 241, 241 (1950) (footnotes

omitted).
92
93
94
95
96
97

See id.
See id. at 241–42.
Id. at 242.
See id.
See id. at 241–42.
U.S. CONST. ART. 1 § 10, cl. 1.
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municipalities, often creatively.98 For example, the Alabama State Legislature’s
response to the City of Mobile’s indebtedness in 1879 was to disappear the City
and its debts.99 State law revoked the City’s charter and erased its boundaries.100
The state then reconstituted the former City as the Port of Mobile, more or less
with the same boundaries as the former city, absent the City of Mobile’s debts.101
Bondholders sued.102 The Supreme Court struck down the state law and reversed
the attempted Houdini act.103 Similar tricks were revealed and repealed by the
Supreme Court around that same time.104
Congress’s decision to confer bankruptcy power—the power to break
contracts—was complicated by the fact that municipalities are “creatures of the
state.”105 The law was declared unconstitutional in 1936 in Ashton v. Cameron
County Water Improvement District.106 In Ashton, the Supreme Court held that
the law interfered with state power over their “creatures” as expressed by the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.107 Congress rewrote the law in 1937.108
The law’s second incarnation survived the Supreme Court in United States v.
Bekins in 1938.109
Since the Great Depression, few municipalities have availed themselves of
the power to break contracts under court supervision as provided by chapter 9 of

98

Professor Gillette has discussed some of these approaches, noting:
Ultimately, animosity towards bond issues spilled over from judicial willingness to invalidate
outstanding indebtedness and into an unwillingness to permit municipalities to incur obligations
in the first instance, even if nullification required some judicial creativity. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, for example, enjoined one issue of bonds that was to be used to aid a railroad on
the grounds that residents had signed the authorizing petition on a Sunday.

Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 643
(2012).
99
Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., The Rights of Creditors of a Municipal Corporation When the State Has
Passed a Law to Abolish or Alter It, 12 VA. L. REG. 175, 175–77 (1906) (citing Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289
(1886)).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 175–80; see Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1867); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.S. 266
(1876); Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879); O’Connor v. Memphis, 74 Tenn. 730 (1881); Graham
v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906).
105
See Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (stating that municipalities are “political subdivisions
of the State”).
106
Lehmann, supra note 91, at 245.
107
Lehmann, supra note 91, at 245.
108
Lehmann, supra note 91, at 245.
109
Lehmann, supra note 91, at 247–48.
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the Code.110 Between 1937 and 2013, it is estimated that approximately 650
municipalities have filed for bankruptcy.111 The majority of those bankruptcies
were filed by special districts: water and sewer districts, public utilities,
development authorities.112 Rarely have major cities filed for bankruptcy.113 In
the 1970s, both Cleveland, Ohio,114 and New York, New York,115 teetered on
the precipice of bankruptcy but were able to resolve their insolvencies with state
and federal intervention. The Great Recession, however, featured a similar
plummet in tax revenues as the Great Depression,116 but with less financial
support for municipalities from the states and Federal Government.117 Distressed
and out of other options, municipal bankruptcy—still a rarity—became a more
popular choice: Vallejo, California, filed in 2008,118 Prichard, Alabama, filed in
2009,119 Central Falls, Rhode Island, filed in 2011,120 Jefferson County,
Alabama, filed in 2011,121 Stockton, California, filed in 2012,122 San
Bernardino, California, filed in 2012,123 and Detroit filed in 2013.124
B. Filing for Bankruptcy
To file for municipal bankruptcy, a debtor must meet these criteria from
section 109(c)(2):
(1) is a municipality;
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by
110

Skeel, supra note 9, at 1080.
Skeel, supra note 9, at 1080.
112
Skeel, supra note 9, at 1080.
113
See Skeel, supra note 9, at 1082 (suggesting that there was a “conventional wisdom that significant
municipalities do not file for Chapter 9”).
114
See generally Letter from Michael Brostek, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Mgmt. & Workforce Issues, to Peter J.
Visclosky, U.S. Rep., House of Reps. (Aug. 21, 1996) (on file with U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.) (a letter
requesting information on the fiscal crisis and subsequent financial recovery of the City of Cleveland in the
1970s).
115
See generally Cong. Budget Off., The Causes of New York City’s Fiscal Crisis, 90 POL. SCI.
QUARTERLY 659, 659 (Winter 1975–76) (discussing how New York City’s budget problems were precipitated
by its inability to borrow money in the municipal bond market).
116
See LUTZ, MOLLOY & SHAN, supra note 18, at 5.
117
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers
of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 585 (2011) (“Given the current degree of state fiscal stress
and falling levels of state aid for local governments . . . states are loathe [sic] to send bailout funding to even the
most troubled local governments.”).
118
In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 288 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
119
In re City of Prichard, No. 1:10-00622-KD-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68747, at *1 (S.D. Ala. 2011).
120
In re City of Cent. Falls, No. 11-13105-FJB, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5432, at *2–3 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2011).
121
In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
122
In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 783 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
123
In re City of San Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 780 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013).
124
In re City of Detroit, 501 B.R. 702, 705 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
111
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name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a
governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to
authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and
(5)(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a
majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends
to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain
the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the
claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in
a case under such chapter;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is
impracticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer
that is avoidable under section 547 of this title.125

The City of Detroit is a “municipal corporation” or “municipality” as defined
by section 101(40) of the Code.126 Once that obvious matter had been
adjudicated, Detroit had to prove it had state authorization to file a case—
authority that was provided on July 18, 2013 by Governor Snyder.127 Third, the
City had to prove that it was insolvent or as it is worded in the Code “unable to
pay its debts as they become due.”128
Detroit’s petition was approved by Judge Steven Rhodes of the Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on December 3, 2013.129 Curiously,
Judge Rhodes ruled that the City had not negotiated with its creditors in good
faith. Judge Rhodes ruled the issue was moot because negotiations were
impracticable; the city’s creditors were said to number over 100,000.130
Outside of bankruptcy court, this ramshackle mess of 100,000 creditors
would have been left to race to the courthouse.131 Instead, the City’s bankruptcy
petition initiated an automatic stay whereby creditor lawsuits outside of
bankruptcy court were halted.132 The City’s decision to file for bankruptcy

125

11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2019).
Id. § 101(40) (“The term ‘municipality’ means political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality
of a State.”).
127
Davey & Walsh, supra note 15.
128
11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(ii).
129
In re City of Detroit, 501 B.R. 191, 230 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
130
Id. at 221.
131
See Lehmann, supra note 91, at 140 (discussing the “lack of any orderly legal procedure” for
municipalities in bankruptcy).
132
See AMDURSKY, GILLETTE & BASS, supra note 10, at 432. The automatic stay is meant to provide the
126
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transformed what likely would have been a disorderly default—whereby
creditors sued the City to obtain compensation for their individual claims—into
an orderly default, where compensation for creditors and recovery for the City
were adjudicated simultaneously and finally.133
C. Disposition of Assets and Liabilities
Due to the enormity of its liabilities, $18 billion in total, and the types of
liabilities, the case moved into unchartered territory. Specifically, the City owed
a lot of money, $3.5 billion, related to promises to provide retirees with pension
income.134 To further complicate matters, Michigan’s Constitution has a
provision that protects public pensions from impairment.135 “The accrued
financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its
political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be
diminished or impaired thereby,” says Article IX, section 24 of Michigan’s
Constitution.136 Shockingly, on December 3, 2013, Judge Rhodes ruled that the
pensions of city retirees could be impaired in bankruptcy.137 That decision
marked the first time a state constitutional provision was overridden in a
bankruptcy court.138
The City owed money to banks and bondholders, too.139 In 2006, the City
entered into complicated deals that involved financial derivatives known as
interest rate swaps.140 Detroit entered into the deals with Bank of America and
UBS to protect itself from potential interest rate shocks from the certificates of
participation issued with a variable interest rate.141 In short, the City “bet” that
interest rates would rise—a bet the City lost as the Federal Reserve System
lowered interest rates in response to the Great Recession.142 The Federal
debtor time to maneuver and potentially reach a settlement with creditors free from duress. See 11 U.S.C. § 362;
AMDURSKY, GILLETTE & BASS, supra note 10, at 432.
133
See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 501 B.R. at 205–06.
134
Id. at 207.
135
See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
136
See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
137
In re City of Detroit, 501 B.R. at 205–06.
138
See Nathan Bomey, Judge: Detroit Can Cut Employee Pensions, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2013, 11:28
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/03/detroit-bankruptcy-pensions/3852377/.
139
See In re City of Detroit, 501 B.R. at 207–08.
140
See Steven Raphael & Steven Church, Detroit Allowed to Pay UBS, BofA $85 Million to End Swaps
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/detroit-wins-approval-ofswaps-deal-with-ubs-bofa.html.
141
See In re City of Detroit, 501 B.R. at 209–10.
142
See Edmund L. Andrews & Jackie Calmes, Fed Cuts Key Rate to a Record Low, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/17/business/economy/17fed.html (discussing the Federal Reserve
“lowering its benchmark interest rate virtually to zero” to fight the recession).
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Reserve’s actions and downward drift of interest rates activated a component to
the swaps deal that mandated the City make hefty payments to the banks that
were on the other side of the bet.143 The City was on the hook for up to $288
million.144 General bondholders were owed even more: $651 million.145
Of the City’s many assets—the DIA collection, Joe Louis Arena, and the
Coleman A. Young Municipal Airport—that could be used to satisfy creditor
claims, the DIA collection was the most valuable. Founded in 1885, the DIA
collection includes 66,000 works, and is widely considered to be the City’s
cultural jewel.146 That such a jewel could be stolen away by creditors attracted a
lot of attention. Not only was the collection’s proposed sale covered in the
Detroit Free Press147 and Detroit News,148 but also in the New York Times,149
Washington Post,150 and across the pond in The Guardian.151
Formerly populous and wealthy, the City had been able to not only provide
its citizens with parks and public safety, but with splendid art by famous artists.
So while the museum operated as a separate nonprofit entity, much of the art
was owned directly by the City. 152 In an appraisal order by the City and
conducted by Christie’s, the auction house estimated that the collection was
worth between $454 million and $867 million.153 To respond to public outcry

143

See In re City of Detroit, 501 B.R. at 210.
Id.
145
Id. at 207.
146
Id.
147
See Joe Guillen & Brent Snavely, Rhodes Signals DIA is Crucial for Detroit’s Viability, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/09/17/
bankruptcy-dia-plummer/15799233/ (“The question of whether the City of Detroit owns the museum and
whether the city should sell some or all of the museum’s most valuable works to pay off creditors, has been
among the central and most controversial questions of the city’s bankruptcy.”).
148
See Chad Livengood, Detroit Offered $4B Loan if It Uses DIA Art as Collateral, THE DETROIT NEWS
(Aug. 27, 2014, 12:46 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2014/08/27/detroitoffered-4b-loan-if-it-uses-dia-art-as-collateral/14685065/.
149
See Randy Kennedy, Fate of Detroit’s Art Hangs in the Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/us/fate-of-detroits-art-hangs-in-the-balance.html.
150
See Katherine Boyle, Donors Pledge $330 Million to Save Detroit Art Museum Collection, WASH.
POST (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/donors-pledge-330-million-tosave-detroit-art-museum-collection/2014/01/13/564c664e-7c83-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
151
See Jonathan Jones, Will the Detroit Institute of Arts Be Forced to Sell Its Treasures?, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec. 4, 2013, 11:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2013/dec/04/detroitinstitute-arts-bankruptcy-sale (“With Detroit official bankrupt, creditors are pressuring the city to sell of some
of the [DIA’s] first-rate art . . . Can Detroit’s art museum survive?”).
152
See Randy Kennedy, A Bruegel, a Rembrandt, a van Gogh: Appraisal Puts Prices on the Priceless in
Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/arts/design/report-sets-values-ondetroit-institute-artworks.html.
153
See id.
144
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over the collection’s potential sale, a concerted effort was made by state and city
officials and the philanthropic community to save the art.154
Members of the philanthropic community raised money to save the art.
Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette issued an opinion that said any sale
would be prohibited by state law.155 On June 20, 2014, two statutes signed into
law by the Governor added $195 million from the state to $366 million already
pledged by the philanthropic community and $100 million from the DIA.156
Often referred to as the “Grand Bargain” in the media, the deal saved the
collection from a fire sale.157 However, despite the near completion of the Grand
Bargain, Financial Guaranty Insurance Company and Syncora Guarantee Inc.,
two creditors that insured the City’s now-defaulted securities, pushed for the
collection’s sale to stem their losses.158
D. Governments in Bankruptcy vs. Companies in Bankruptcy
Notably, neither the bankruptcy court nor creditors could force the City to
sell the collection.159 To appreciate why Detroit could not be forced to sell the
collection, one must appreciate that municipalities are unique in their political
status. The Code does not treat municipal debtors the same as commercial
debtors.160 For one, the bankruptcy court does not appoint a trustee to oversee
154
See generally Brittney Kohn, Note, Detroit Institute of Arts: A Cultural Gem or Detroit’s Piggy Bank,
60 WAYNE L. REV. 515, 542 (2014) (describing the community’s efforts to transfer the DIA’s art to a charitable
trust, thereby preventing future liquidation).
155
Mich. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter (June 13, 2013) (“It is my opinion, therefore, that the art collection
of the Detroit Institute of Arts is held by the City of Detroit in charitable trust for the people of Michigan, and
no piece in the collection may thus be sold, conveyed, or transferred to satisfy City debts or obligations”).
156
Snyder Signs Detroit Bankruptcy Bills, Says ‘There’s More Work To Be Done’, MANISTEE NEWS
ADVOCATE (June 20, 2014, 11:27 PM), https://www.manisteenews.com/state-news/article/Snyder-signsDetroit-bankruptcy-bills-says-14224711.php (noting the “grand bargain” legislation provided $195 million from
the state to the Detroit Institute of Arts); ‘Grand Bargain’ in Detroit Exemplifies New Kind of Philanthropy,
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIGEST (Nov. 17, 2014), https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/grand-bargain-indetroit-exemplifies-new-kind-of-philanthropy.
157
See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, ‘Grand Bargain’ Saves the Detroit Institute of Arts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/arts/design/grand-bargain-saves-the-detroit-institute-of-arts.html.
158
See In re City of Detroit, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4061, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2014); see
Karen Pierog, Bond Insurer Syncora is Stubborn City Rival in Detroit’s Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 26, 2014,
7:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-syncora-guaran/bond-insurer-syncora-isstubborn-city-rival-in-detroits-bankruptcy-idUSKBN0F10CQ20140626 (noting that Syncora and Financial
Guaranty Insurance Co. “objected to the ‘grand bargain’ in which philanthropic foundations and the state of
Michigan have pledged millions of dollars to ease pension cuts on city retirees and protect parts of the Detroit
Institute of Arts’ collection from being sold.”).
159
See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2019).
160
See generally id. §§ 901–46 (evident by the fact that municipalities are required to file under chapter 9
of the Code, but treatment under chapter 9 provisions for municipal debtors, too, is quite different from corporate
debtors).
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the debtor’s estate as it would in a commercial bankruptcy.161 Local elected
officials (or state appointees in Detroit’s case) remain in control of a municipal
debtor and its operations as prescribed by section 904 of the Code.162 The
bankruptcy court cannot issue writs of mandamus, order the sale of assets,
remove local elected officials (even those who may have mishandled public
monies) or enact public policy.163 Equally important, commercial debtors can be
liquidated. If their rehabilitation is not deemed feasible, commercial debtors
have their assets sold off to satisfy creditor claims.164 In contrast, a bankruptcy
court cannot order a municipal debtor to disincorporate—revoke its local charter
and erase its boundaries for purposes of liquidation.165
E. Plan of Adjustment
On February 21, 2014, the City filed its plan of adjustment.166 The plan of
adjustment is a municipal debtor’s settlement proposal; it says who will be paid,
how much they will be paid and who will not be paid at all.167 City retirees, a
majority of whom supported the City’s plan, received most of what they were
owed.168 General retirees’ pension income was impaired by approximately
26%.169 Retired police and fire employees had their pension income impaired by
approximately 4%.170 Monies from the Grand Bargain were used to lessen the
cuts to pensioners.171 On the other hand, creditors such as bondholders were cut
161

See id. § 904.
Id.
163
See id. § 904(1)–(3).
164
See Anderson, supra note 90, at 1385–86 (noting that “Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . does not
require dissolution if a municipality files for bankruptcy”). Anderson later notes that dissolution is almost never
the superior option, compared to bankruptcy, because dissolution offers no promise of a fresh start for a
municipality, indeed, “in most states[,] a dissolving city will take its debt with it in the form of a special taxing
district.” Anderson, supra note 90, at 1385–86.
165
See Anderson, supra note 90, at 1385 (noting the Code cannot force a city to dissolve or more toward
dissolution).
166
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
167
11 U.S.C. § 943(b).
168
See Susan Tompor, Even Five Years Later, Retirees Feel the Effects of Detroit’s Bankruptcy, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (July 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/personal-finance/susan-tompor/
2018/07/18/detroit-bankruptcy-retirees-pension/759446002/ (noting that City retirees had pensions cut by
4.5%); Skeel, supra note 59, at 145–46.
169
See Skeel, supra note 59, at 145.
170
See Detroit’s Bankruptcy: Cram Down, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2014), https://www.economist.com/
united-states/2014/03/01/cram-down.
171
The Detroit Historical Society has noted this effect, too:
162

Under the terms of the bargain, $816 million was donated by multiple foundations (consolidated
into the Foundation for Detroit’s Future), Detroit Institute of Arts donors, and the State of
Michigan. The funds were to be dispersed over twenty years to the General Retirement System
and the Police and Fire Retirement System to help ameliorate retiree pension cuts necessitated
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much deeper. Under the plan, investors who purchased City bonds only received
sixty-four cents back for every dollar that they lent the City.172
The Code provides creditors the opportunity to review a plan of adjustment.
However, in municipal bankruptcy, creditors cannot submit an alternate plan for
consideration as they could in commercial bankruptcy.173 Still, creditor support
is needed for a plan of adjustment to be consummated in most circumstances;
specifically, plan confirmation requires the consent of creditors who hold at least
two-thirds of the amount of claims per creditor class and 51% or more of the
number of claims per creditor class.174 But if even one creditor class—such as
pensioners or bondholders—consents to a plan, the plan may be forced onto
other creditors who do not consent.175 This is known as a “cramdown”, and this
is the method by which Detroit’s case came to a conclusion on November 7,
2014.176 The Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation of the plan of adjustment
consummated the Grand Bargain and reduced the City’s liabilities by $7
billion.177
IV. FINANCIAL TURNAROUND—A “FRESH START”
In the ten years that preceded the City’s bankruptcy, the City lost population
and tax revenue.178 Between Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2004 and FY 2013, the City’s
General Fund—the City’s primary account for tax receipts and operational
disbursements—ran a deficit (expenditures exceeded revenues) in FY 2004, FY
by the bankruptcy. With the bargain in place, Detroit city retirees voted to accept the pension cuts
and the DIA was allowed to become an independent institution, owned by a charitable trust,
forever protecting its masterpieces from being considered city-owned assets.
DETROIT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, GRAND BARGAIN (2020) (Online Encyclopedia), https://detroithistorical.org/
learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/grand-bargain
172
Id.
173
See AMDURSKY, GILLETTE & BASS, supra note 10, at 439.
174
See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2019) (incorporating § 1126(a)–(c); (e)–(g) into chapter 9); Richard M. Hynes
& Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 25, 59
(2015); see also Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 1976
DUKE L.J. 1157, 1172 (1977) (discussing the analogous provision, 11 U.S.C. § 92(b), in the 1970 Code).
175
See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(B) into chapter 9).
176
See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 260 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); AMDURSKY, GILLETTE & BASS,
supra note 10, at 437–38.
177
See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 162.
178
See John F. McDonald, A Declining Population and City Revenues Meant that Detroit’s Bankruptcy
Could Not Have Been Avoided, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS—U.S. CENTRE (Feb. 5, 2014), https://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/usappblog/2014/02/05/a-declining-population-and-city-revenues-meant-that-detroits-bankruptcy-couldnot-have-been-avoided/. See generally John F. McDonald, What Happened to and in Detroit?, 51 URB. STUD.
3309 (2014) (examining the various factors that drove Detroit to bankruptcy, finding that population and tax
revenue decline led the City to fiscal insolvency).
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2005, FY 2006, FY 2008, FY 2009, FY 2011 and FY 2012—seven out of ten
years.179 The account balance of the General Fund, the public sector equivalent
of net worth, fell and remained below zero between FY 2004 and FY 2013.180
From FY 2004 to FY 2013, General Fund revenue fell from $1.4 billion to
$1 billion—a 29% decline.181 In FY 2013, the fiscal year that ended immediately
before the City filed for bankruptcy, the City had $82.4 million in cash on
hand.182 Over the period of FY 2004 to FY 2013, the City borrowed to obtain
cash for operational needs—to pay employees, vendors and bondholders—and
still often found itself short.183
General Fund revenue remained relatively flat between FY 2015, which
marked the end of the City’s bankruptcy, and FY 2018.184 Yet, the City has been
able to run operational surpluses each year.185 The accumulation of this prior
years’ surplus has allowed the City to substantially increase its cash on hand.186
In FY 2018, the City ended the year with $472.4 million in cash on hand—a
$390 million increase over FY 2013.187

179
MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 2004, at 35 (2005), https://treas-secure.state.mi.us/lafdocsearch/tl41R01.aspx?&lu_id=5431
&doc_yr=2004&doc_code=; MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP.
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2005, at 35 (2006), https://treas-secure.state.mi.us/lafdocsearch/tl41R01.
aspx?&lu_id=5431&doc_yr=2005&doc_code=AUD; MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT
COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2006, at 35 (2008), https://TreasSecure.State.Mi.Us/Lafdocsearch/Tl41r01.Aspx?&Lu_Id=5431&Doc_Yr=2006&Doc_Code=AUD; MICH. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2008, at
35 (2009), https://Treas-Secure.State.Mi.Us/Lafdocsearch/Tl41r01.Aspx?&Lu_Id=5431&Doc_Yr=2008&
Doc_Code=AUD; MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2009, at 35 (2010), https://Treas-Secure.State.Mi.Us/Lafdocsearch/Tl41r01.
Aspx?&Lu_Id=5431&Doc_Yr=2009&Doc_Code=AUD; MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT
COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2011, at 43 (2011), https://TreasSecure.State.Mi.Us/Lafdocsearch/Tl41r01.Aspx?&Lu_Id=5431&Doc_Yr=2011&Doc_Code=AUD; MICH. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2012, at
47 (2012), https://Treas-Secure.State.Mi.Us/Lafdocsearch/Tl41r01.Aspx?&Lu_Id=5431&Doc_Yr=2012&
Doc_Code=AUD; MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CITY OF DETROIT COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2013, at 47 (2014), https://Treas-Secure.State.Mi.Us/Lafdocsearch/Tl41r01.
Aspx?&Lu_Id=5431&Doc_Yr=2013&Doc_Code=AUD.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
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In the post-bankruptcy period of FY 2015 to FY 2018, the City has been able
to build up cash reserves, make public investments to improve quality of life,
and spur economic development.188 By all accounts, the City appears to have
achieved a fresh start. Under the fresh start theory, a previously insolvent
debtor—in this case a municipality—unable to keep its promises to either
creditors or citizens, starts anew after its debts are reduced in bankruptcy
court.189 The formerly bankrupt municipality can now use the resources that
otherwise would have been directed to debt service toward public investments
needed to attract new citizens and businesses.190 Much like General Motor’s
profitability post-bankruptcy, Detroit has run impressive surpluses and
improved its operations.191
V. CITY’S BOND OFFER
In 2018, nearly four years post-bankruptcy, the City was ready to reenter the
municipal securities market. The City initially offered $110,915,000 in
“Unlimited Tax General Obligation Bonds,” bonds that were “payable from the
general funds of the city, and secured by a pledge of the full faith, credit and
resources of the City.”192 The preliminary official statement—or initial offer—
188
See City of Detroit Mayor’s Off., City and Business Partners Announce Historic $35M Corporate
Commitment to Detroit Neighborhoods, CITY OF DETROIT (Dec. 10, 2008), https://detroitmi.gov/news/city-andbusiness-partners-announce-historic-35m-corporate-commitment-detroit-neighborhoods (noting that “Detroit’s
neighborhoods are getting a record $35 million boost to spur development and physical improvements”).
189
See Laura Napoli Coordes, Restructuring Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 307, 348 n. 268
(2016) (noting that some scholars have compared a municipality’s fresh start as “more akin to individual
bankruptcy than business bankruptcy” because the fresh start does not encumber the municipality in the way
that a typical restructuring might) (citing to Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic
Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 292 (2012)).
190
Professor Kimhi has discussed the theory undergirding Detroit’s use of bankruptcy as a means of
recovery, noting:

Using bankruptcy, the locality can decrease its debt burden and reduce its local taxes. The
relatively low tax rates promote productivity, improve local economic performance, and help the
locality recover. The underlying assumption is that mitigating the city’s financial hardship
provides the locality with a fresh start and enables its rehabilitation, to the benefit of both
residents and creditors.
Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 653–54
(2008).
191
Compare Nick Bunkley, Resurgent G.M. Posts 2010 Profit of $4.7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/business/25auto.html, with Christine Ferretti, After Detroit Bankruptcy:
Optimism, But ‘Challenges are Real’, THE DETROIT NEWS (July 19, 2018, 8:34 PM), https://www.detroitnews.
com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/07/18/detroit-bankruptcy-optimism-but-challenges-real/772729002/.
192
CITY OF DETROIT, CNTY. OF WAYNE, STATE OF MICH. UNLIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS,
SERIES 2018 (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1222098-ES954190-ES1355147.pdf; see Chad Livengood,
Detroit Sells $135 Million in Bonds with Its Own Credit, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Dec. 5, 2018, 9:39 AM),
https://www.crainsdetroit.com/government/detroit-sells-135-million-bonds-its-own-credit (noting that the City
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was dated November 16, 2018 and did not include an amortization schedule or
interest rate.193
The Detroit city council passed a resolution on October 23, 2018 to support
the new bond issuance so that the City could pay for capital projects.194 Because
the City’s offer was oversubscribed, the City was able to increase its offer
amount by $24,085,000 to $135,000,000 at a 5% interest rate per the official
statement dated December 4, 2018.195 The additional bond proceeds will be used
to expand the list of capital projects that the City can undertake to continue its
post-bankruptcy recovery.
VI. MARKET CONDITIONS
Market participants anticipated a decline in municipal borrowing after a rush
to the market by municipal units in December 2017.196 This anticipated decline
was, at least in part, motivated by the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017.197 The Tax
Cut and Jobs Act made a number of reforms to the federal tax code, most notably
a reduction in the top rate for the corporate income tax to 21% from 35%.198
Municipal issuers became concerned that those reforms would reduce the
attractiveness of municipal bonds.199 However, the tax law had little impact on
the municipal securities market.200 Still, the Federal Reserve indicated that it
would raise the federal funds rate or discount rate, threatening the value of
municipal bonds.201 Like all bonds, the value of municipal bonds has an inverse
relationship with the interest rate.202 If interest rates rise, the value of bonds
decrease because, theoretically investors could have put their money in another
asset and earned more interest.203 Declines in interest rates have the opposite

would raise between $110–135 million from their first bond offering post-bankruptcy).
193
See CITY OF DETROIT, CNTY. OF WAYNE, STATE OF MICH. UNLIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION
BONDS, SERIES 2018 (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1222098-ES954190-ES1355147.pdf.
194
See id.
195
See id.
196
See, e.g., David Hammer & Sean McCarthy, Munis in Focus: 2018 Municipal Market Outlook, PIMCO
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.pimco.com/en-us/insights/investment-strategies/featured-solutions/munis-in-focus2018-municipal-market-outlook.
197
See Heather Gillers, Tax Bill Jolts Municipal-Bond Market, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2017, 11:22 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-bill-jolts-municipal-bond-market-1513593001.
198
See Hammer & McCarthy, supra note 196 (“The reduction in corporate tax rates to 21% from 35% is
quite meaningful for muni yields on a taxable-equivalent basis”); Gillers, supra note 197.
199
See Gillers, supra note 197.
200
See Hammer & McCarthy, supra note 196.
201
See Hammer & McCarthy, supra note 196.
202
See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 128–31.
203
See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 128–31.
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effect.204 In 2018, the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate four times.
Rates were raised on March 22, June 14, September 27, and December 20.205
Stock market volatility, driven by federal funds rate increases and President
Donald Trump’s enactment of tariffs on trade partners, made municipal bonds
more attractive to investors.206 Standard and Poor’s 500, an American stock
market index, peaked at 2,930.75 on September 20, 2018 and ended the year at
2,506.85.207 On December 4, the day the bonds was issued, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, another market index, fell by 799.36 points.208 Standard and
Poor’s 500 fell to 2,700 and the NASDAQ fell by 283.09 points to 7,158.43.209
In response, investors flocked to U.S. treasuries and municipal bonds.210
Prior to the City’s bond issuance, both Moody’s Investor Service and
Standard and Poor’s rated the City’s creditworthiness. On November 2, 2018,
Moody’s issued a report that rated the City’s debt at Ba3, one notch above junk
status.211 In its report, Moody’s said the City’s economic base “remains weak
relative to peers and carries high recession risk stemming from low diversity”
and “a volatile revenue structure and very high overlapping debt and capital
needs.”212 To justify its stable outlook in the presence of these weaknesses,
Moody’s cited the City’s “strong preparation for challenges ahead including the
need to make capital investments and absorb pending spikes to fixed cost.”213

204

See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 128–31.
See FED. RES. SYS., OPEN MKT. OPERATIONS (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
openmarket.htm. (The “FOMC’s target federal funds rate or range, change (basis points) and level” section
indicates there was a twenty-five-basis-point increase in the federal funds rate on March 22, June 14, September
27, and December 30, 2018, a 100-basis-point increase over the year.).
206
See Emily Flitter, Stocks Rise as Wall St.’s Roller Coaster Stages Late-Date Rally, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/business/global-stock-markets.html; Stephen Shultz, Muni
Bonds: Winners in 2018 and Bright Skies for 2019, BROWN ADVISORY (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.
brownadvisory.com/us/muni-bonds-winners-2018-and-bright-skies-ahead-2019.
207
S&P 500 Index, WALL ST. J. (last visited Oct. 3, 2020), https://quotes.wsj.com/index/SPX (search
“September 20, 2018” as the date of the index).
208
Michael Wursthorn & David Hodari, Dow Tumbles Nearly 800 Points as Trade Jitters Return, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-tumbles-nearly-800-points-as-trade-jittersreturn-1543959007.
209
Id.
210
See Daniel Kruger, U.S. Government Bonds Gain as Stocks Sink, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:40 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-government-bonds-gain-yield-curve-flattens-1543938831?mod=article_
inline.
211
Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody’s Assigns Ba3 to Detroit, MI’s GO Bonds; Outlook
Stable, MOODY’S (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.cityofdetroitbonds.com/detroit-mi-investor-relations-mi/
documents/view-file/i1383?mediaId=249209.
212
Id.
213
Id
205
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In a credit rating approximate to that used by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s
rated the City’s debt at B+ with a stable outlook on February 7, 2019.214 Like
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s cited the City’s weak economy and noted that the
City’s “pension plans are poorly funded and represent a significant unfunded
long-term liability and source of budgetary pressure.”215 Yet, the report also
commended the City for the development of cash reserves and financial
management reforms such as the adoption of multi-year budgeting, revenue
estimating conferences, and centralization of financial operations in the newly
created Office of the Chief Financial Officer.216 In both reports, the credit rating
agencies were cautiously optimistic about the City’s recovery and ability to
repay its debts.217
VII. MARKET CONDITIONS
Municipal bankruptcy is rare. In part, that rarity can be explained by the
infrequency of municipal default: it is rare for a municipal debtor to fail to pay
its debts in full and on time. Of those few defaults, an even smaller number of
cases will be resolved in bankruptcy court. However, scholars have offered
another reason: the threat of reputational harm.218 Simply put, a bankrupted
debtor will be seen as a deadbeat—even after a “successful” bankruptcy where
debt has been adjusted and the debtor better able to meet both its commitments
to creditors and citizens.219 Detroit’s reentry into the municipal securities market
is not, in and of itself, cause to reject that theory, but it is a reason to question
the theory of reputational harm more deeply than it has been before.
Detroit’s case offers an entryway to discussion for a few reasons. First, the
City is an unfortunate example of economic decline220 and “financial
embarrassment.”221 Detroit’s bankruptcy was widely publicized. Second, the
214
John Sauter & Jane H. Ridley, Detroit; General Obligation, S&P GLOBAL RATINGS 2 (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.cityofdetroitbonds.com/detroit-mi-investor-relations-mi/documents/view-file/i1383?mediaId=
307761.
215
Id. at 9.
216
Id. at 11.
217
Id.; Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody’s Assigns Ba3 to Detroit, MI’s GO Bonds;
Outlook Stable, MOODY’S (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.cityofdetroitbonds.com/detroit-mi-investor-relationsmi/documents/view-file/i1383?mediaId=249209.
218
See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 351, 382 (2010).
219
Id.
220
Scott Beyer, Why Has Detroit Continued to Decline?, FORBES (July 31, 2018, 11:58 PM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2018/07/31/why-has-detroit-continued-to-decline/#23b9a1e13fbe.
221
See generally Edward J. Dimock, Legal Problems of Financially Embarrassed Municipalities, 22 VA.
L. REV. 39, 39 (1936) (discussing the issues that finically embarrassed municipalities face).
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City’s market reentry occurred only a few years after its bankruptcy case
concluded.222 In all likelihood, the City’s default and bankruptcy were still on
the minds of potential investors. Also, while the issuance of general obligations
is not the first issuance by the City after it concluded its case, it is the first
issuance based on the City’s own creditworthiness.223 In other words, the City’s
full faith and credit is all that assures repayment.224 This is another area where
the City’s case is special and different from others.
Up until the City’s case, it was believed that a municipal debtor’s pledge of
its full faith and credit was an unbreakable vow—even in bankruptcy.225 This
belief was not merely an extension of debtor and creditor law, but rather the
ethos of the municipal securities market.226 Orange County, California, which
filed for bankruptcy after a disastrous investment ploy by its treasurer-tax
collector, Robert Citron, held bondholders harmless.227 Central Falls, Rhode
Island, held bondholders harmless too, even as it asked some of its pensioners
to sacrifice up to 55% of the pension income promised to them by the City.228
Detroit broke that vow.229

222
CITY OF DETROIT, CNTY. OF WAYNE, STATE OF MICH. UNLIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS,
SERIES 2018 (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1222098-ES954190-ES1355147.pdf.
223
See CITY OF DETROIT, CNTY. OF WAYNE, STATE OF MICH. UNLIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION
BONDS, SERIES 2018 (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1222098-ES954190-ES1355147.pdf.
224
Detroit Sees Little Bankruptcy Penalty as It Sells Muni Bonds, DETROIT NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018, 9:26
AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/12/04/detroit-municipal-muni-bondsbond-market/38673439/.
225
Randle Pollard, Feeling Insecure—A State View of Whether Investors in Municipal General Obligation
Bonds Have a Mere Promise to Pay or a Binding Obligation, 24 WIDENER L. J. 19, 35–39 (2015) (“Historically,
investors generally assumed that UTGO bonds investors and pension benefits received the highest priority
treatment, followed by LTGO bonds, pension obligation investment instruments, other general fund claims, and
lastly retiree healthcare obligations”).
226
See id. at 21.
227
In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 185, 192 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995), rev’d 189 B.R. 499 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1995) (“Section 928 was narrowly crafted to apply only to special revenue bonds. Congress could have
made § 928 applicable to all municipal bonds, but it chose to limit its application. Section 552(a) is, therefore,
still applicable to general revenue bonds”).
228
In re City of Cent. Falls, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5432, at *2 (Bankr. D.R.I. Nov. 2, 2011). The
bondholders’ escape in the City of Central Falls case was widely publicized. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central
Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525,
526 (2013) (“Central Falls’ bondholders’ rights were well protected; the restructuring that was ultimately
approved imposed virtually all of the costs onto current and former municipal employees and taxpayers”); Hilary
Russ, Bankruptcy Saves Tiny Rhode Island City, But Leaves Scars, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2012, 8:10 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-rhodeisland-centralfalls-bankrupt/bankruptcy-saves-tiny-rhode-island-city-but-leaves-scars-id
USBRE88300220120904.
229
See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 198 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (confirming the bondholder-city
settlement where bondholders’ interest was impaired).
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Debt, and by extension, the holder of that debt, is either secured or
unsecured. Debt is secured when the debtor has promised collateral to the
creditor. Upon default, a creditor may then exercise their claim and hold or sell
the collateral to make themselves whole. Unsecured debt is the opposite.
Unsecured debt is unprotected and is therefore subject to impairment in
bankruptcy.230 Bondholders believed themselves to be secured creditors.231
Rather than bear any cost, bondholders believed that City retirees via reduced
pension income, and residents via reduced services, would bear the cost of
bankruptcy.232 Instead, the City insisted that general obligation bondholders
were treated as any other unsecured creditor.233 While the matter was not fully
adjudicated, the City’s plan of adjustment repaid bondholders less than they
were owed.234 The results of Detroit’s case not only upended market
assumptions and theories of bankruptcy law, but further makes the case for
analysis of the City’s reentry into the municipal securities market.
Evidence from Orange County’s bankruptcy provides some empirical
support to the existence of a market penalty.235 Research published in The
Financial Review in 2004 found at the time that there was a penalty to be paid
or “contagion” that spread to the municipal securities market at least in the
immediacy of the county’s bankruptcy filing.236 More precisely, the researchers
found “contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal
returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and
for non-Orange County municipal bonds.”237 Similarly, Genesee County,
Michigan halted the issuance of $54.2 million in bonds two weeks after Detroit
filed for bankruptcy under the belief it would pay a market penalty.238 The case
for a market penalty is not conclusive, however. But since there is at least some
evidence of a market penalty for bankruptcy, it must then be asked why Detroit
230
See generally Skeel, supra note 32, at 676–77 (describing liens, security statuses in the context of
municipal bankruptcies, and particularly, the Detroit bankruptcy).
231
See Skeel, supra note 32, at 694 (“There also are strong normative grounds for the conclusion that
pensions can be restructured, at least under some circumstances”).
232
Karen Pierog, Detroit’s Bankruptcy Plan Spares Pensions from Deepest Cuts, REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2014,
8:35 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy/detroits-bankruptcy-plan-spares-pensionsfrom-deepest-cuts-idUSBREA1K1G520140222.
233
Id.; see Skeel, supra note 32, at 694–98.
234
See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 198.
235
John M. Halstead, Shantaram Hegde & Linda Schmid Klein, Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial
Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39 FIN. REV. 293, 302–06 (2004).
236
Id. at 303–06.
237
Id. at 293.
238
Brian Chappatta, Michigan County Puts Off Bond Sale Amid Detroit Penalty, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug.
2, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-02/michigan-county-puts-off-bondsale-amid-detroit-penalty.
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does not appear to have paid it? Phrased another way: why was there excess
demand for Detroit’s bond issuance when the City had impaired contracts with
bondholders only a few years back?
As stated earlier, municipal bonds are an investment made by the bond
purchasers.239 Individuals and institutions lend money via bond purchases to the
municipal bond issuers.240 The bondholder’s primary concern is to be repaid
their initial investment and profit from the interest paid by the borrower.241
Ostensibly $7.4 billion less indebted than it was pre-bankruptcy, Detroit had
fewer claims on its limited resources post-bankruptcy.242 Moreover, a number
of Detroit’s financial metrics improved between 2013 and 2018.243 For example,
debt as a percent of taxable value (value of the City’s tax base) fell from 26% in
FY 2013 to 22% in FY 2018 in spite of a citywide reassessment that lowered the
taxable value between those years.244 Simply put, Detroit has less debt. The City
has fewer liabilities to compromise its financial condition and is more likely to
pay back what it owes (satisfying bondholders) post-bankruptcy.
Consider other financially distressed municipalities, such as the Chicago
Public Schools (CPS), that have not had the benefit of debt adjustment. CPS debt
is rated as junk.245 The school district’s pension fund for teachers is underfunded,
and the demand to fulfill its promises to retirees has diminished its ability to
fulfill its promises to students.246 In 2018, CPS issued $1.3 billion in “Unlimited
Tax General Obligation Refunding Bonds.”247 On November 30, 2018, CPS’s
last issuance, CPS issued $763,395,000 in bonds supported by the “full faith and
credit and the taxing power” of the Chicago Board of Education.248 Like Detroit,
CPS had run annual deficits in prior years, cut services, and is at risk of
insolvency. Like Detroit, the debt issued by CPS carried an interest rate of 5%.249
239

SCOTT, supra note 21, at 2.
SCOTT, supra note 21, at 2.
241
SCOTT, supra note 21, at 5–7.
242
See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
243
Klinefelter, supra note 17.
244
CITY OF DETROIT COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2018 (2018),
https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/2019-10/FY_2018_CAFR.pdf (on file with the Michigan
Secretary of State).
245
Banerji, supra note 2 (noting Detroit’s new bond offerings “priced with yields about 0.2 percentage
points lower than five-year debt sold recently by the Chicago Board of Education . . . .”).
246
See Juan Perez, Jr., Chicago Public Schools’ Huge Pension Debt Just Got $1 Billion Deeper, New
Estimates Show, THE CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2018, 6:45 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-metchicago-teachers-pension-fund-update-20180313-story.html.
247
See id.
248
BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHI., UNLIMITED TAX GEN. OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS, SERIES
2018C, 2018D (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1222772-ES954787-ES1355739.pdf.
249
Id.
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Yet unlike Detroit, CPS is not yet insolvent and has not declared bankruptcy.
So, what then was the market penalty for Detroit?
CONCLUSION
This Article does not mean to insinuate that there is no market penalty for
bankruptcy. Detroit and any other bankrupted debtor would still be assumed to
pay more in interest than a municipality that had never defaulted. Rather, this
Article asks and attempts to answer why Detroit does not appear to have paid an
explicit market penalty as some theorized it would.250 Either one or a
combination of two alternative theories may explain the absence of a more
explicit market penalty. The first is the “fresh start” theory. In short, investors
determined that Detroit had rehabilitated post-bankruptcy. Because the main
interest of investors is to be repaid, investors may understandably look more
favorably on a city like Detroit that is in better financial condition postbankruptcy.
The second theory is that market conditions caused investors to overlook
elements of the City’s profile that otherwise would have disqualified it from
borrowing. In 2018, the year Detroit issued its bonds, investors’ attention was
unusually drawn to the municipal securities market.251 This was because stock
market volatility led investors to focus on fixed-income securities like municipal
bonds.252 These market conditions may have led investors to overlook the City’s
demerits, and had the City offered debt on a different occasion it may have
attracted more scrutiny and found the market less receptive.
Bankruptcy is the last resort for insolvent municipalities and should remain
so, irrespective of the conclusions of this Article. The process can be
expensive,253 not merely in monetary terms, the cost of attorneys and financial
advisors, but in time. Detroit’s case was resolved relatively quickly compared to
Jefferson County—the county spent nearly three years in bankruptcy court.254
Moreover, the process is uncertain. Few cases mean little precedent. Lastly, the
implicit cost to a community’s reputation may be extensive.255
250

See BARSON, ET AL., supra note 5, at 11.
See Gillers, supra note 197.
252
See Gillers, supra note 197.
253
See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Plan to Exit Bankruptcy Is Approved for Detroit, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/us/detroit-bankruptcy-plan-ruling.html.
254
Compare In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (showing a municipality
bankruptcy case lasting just over one year), with In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 245 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
2012) (showing a municipality bankruptcy case lasting three years).
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See BARSON, ET AL., supra note 5, at 11–12.
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Detroit’s successful reentry to the municipal securities market is reason to
believe that the implicit cost may be less than assumed, however. Moreover, if
participants in the municipal securities market do not distinguish between
bankrupted municipalities and financially distressed municipalities, then those
latter entities may deem bankruptcy to be an attractive option. If there is no
reward for having avoided bankruptcy, why should distressed entities suffer a
potentially disorderly default or the punitive austerity needed to pay creditors
with limited revenues?256 In other words, market participants may
unintentionally make bankruptcy, a process by which their investments are
imperiled, more attractive to insolvent municipalities.

256
See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1128–29 (2014)
(juxtaposing bankruptcy with fiscal austerity to overcome municipal finance troubles.).

